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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent policy interventions from European Central 
Bank (for example Draghi's "Whatever it takes"3 , the 
disclosure of Comprehensive Assessment results4, 
cuts and hikes in key interest rates) have produced 
diverse market reactions (Angeloni & Ehrmann, 
2003; Bohl et al., 2008; Hussain, 2011; Fiordelisi & 
Ricci, 2015; Haitsma et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, changes in stock prices can also 
be affected by the disclosure of firm-specific 
information5 and this is indeed why listed 
companies must comply specific disclosure 
requirements. Corporate disclosure can be defined 
as the information flow that goes from the 
management of a company to its shareholders and 
in order to fill the information asymmetries. This 
can be perceived as a need to mind and fill the gap 
between managers and shareholders information – 
well-known as agency (or principal-agent) problem 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1981). The aim of 
corporate disclosure is “to communicate firm 
performance and governance to outside investors” 
                                                          
3 at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 July 2012. 
4 26 October 2014. 
5 Ryan and Taffler (2002) find that 65% of large stock price changes can be 
related to firm-specific information. 
(Haely & Palepu, 2001). In this paper, we refer in 
particular to disclosure related to corporate 
governance, with a specific focus on the banking 
sector. We expect our findings to be relevant for 
banks' management, in order to make careful and 
prudent decisions about the information they are 
going to disclose. Moreover, our findings are 
expected to be relevant since the stock market 
reaction on a bank (and other companies) 
disclosure – thus how a bank is perceived by 
investors – has consequences on its valuation and 
indirectly on its financial soundness. There are many 
types of bank-specific information that need to be 
disclosed to stakeholders: e.g. financial information, 
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), merger and acquisition strategies (M&As). 
Moreover, disclosure takes different forms (Farvaque 
et al., 2011): e.g. financial reporting (financial 
statements, business plans, ...), press releases, 
conferences, road shows. The most timely source of 
firm-specific information is a firm press release, 
which can be classified as price sensitive or not in 
respect of the type of information disclosed 
(examples of price-sensitive press releases can be: 
disclosure of interim results, financing issues, M&A 
decisions). Therefore, is reasonable and interesting to 
analyse the price sensitiveness of the disclosure of a 
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bank press release as it may change firm's market 
price and impacts on the bank's market performance.  
To answer our research question, the aim of 
this analysis is to study the impact on stock prices 
and the related volatility of press releases that 
contain Corporate Governance information in Euro 
area banks listed on the Eurostoxx banks index.  
Indeed, using an event study methodology on 
70 press releases of the whole sample of banks 
listed on the Eurostoxx Banks Index, from 2007 to 
2016, we find that prices and therefore investment 
decisions are significantly but negatively influenced 
by the disclosure of a press release on corporate 
governance, as if this kind of news leads investors to 
perceive the bank's prospects negatively. This 
finding contributes to the strand of literature on 
voluntary disclosure that claims that an important 
driver of the disclosure and announcements to 
investors is that firms are inclined to send a signal to 
the market to obtain economic benefits (Fung et al., 
2007; Utrero-Gonzalez & Callado-Munoz, 2016). In 
this perspective, voluntary disclosure is perceived to 
be biased by the incentive of the firms to overstate 
the good and understate their bad practices (Kruger, 
2015; Utrero-Gonzalez & Callado-Munoz, 2016).  
The best of our knowledge this is the first 
paper that investigates European banks press 
releases on corporate governance.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
reviews the literature; Section 3 illustrates the 
sample of the analysis and the model; Section 4 
presents the results and Section 5 concludes and 
discusses policy implications that emerge. 
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Growing attention has been given to market reaction 
following monetary policy interventions. 
Nonetheless, literature concerning this issue is 
recent and leads to mixed results. Moreover, most 
research focuses on the United States (Haitsma et al., 
2016). Studies on Eurozone are few (Fatum & 
Hutchison, 2002; Petrella & Resti, 2013; Fiordelisi & 
Ricci, 2015; Haitsma et al., 2016). Indeed, Fatum and 
Hutchison (2002) investigate ECB intervention and 
intervention-related “news” on the euro exchange 
rate; Petrella and Resti (2013) analyze the impact on 
stock prices of the disclosure of the stress test 
results by the European Banking Authority (EBA); 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2015) assess the value of policy 
actions in banking starting from Draghi's well-known 
"Whatever it takes"; Haitsma et al. (2016) analyse the 
impact of ECB's conventional and unconventional 
monetary policies on stock market prices. 
On the other hand, the role of firm-based 
information and the impact of financial news has 
been extensively studied in prior literature (Fama, 
1965; Niederhoffer, 1971; Merton, 1987; Ryan & 
Taffler, 2002). In particular, the earliest studies are 
well reviewed by Kothari and Warner (2006) and 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) which classify the 
literature by the topic investigated with the event 
study methodology (Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Corporate Governance, Joint Ventures, Legislation, 
Investment and Miscellaneous). In particular, as 
concerns corporate governance, McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997) reports Worrell et al. (1993) which 
investigate market reactions to announcements of 
the firings of key executives made over 1963-1987 
and found that permanent replacements are 
positively associated with market reactions, whereas 
other types of firing do not raise investors' 
reactions. Davidson et al. (1993) find that the 
announcements of CEO succession in bankrupt 
firms are associated with positive abnormal returns. 
Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) focus on antitakeover 
amendments; Turk (1992) on Managerial response to 
takeover bids; Chatterjee et al. (1992), Seth (1990), 
Shelton (1988), Lubatkin (1987), Singh and 
Montgomery (1987) and Chatterjee (1986) on 
mergers and acquisitions; Markides (1992) on 
corporate refocusing; Davidson et al. (1990) analyse 
the market reaction on the announcements of 367 
key executives appointments in a sample of 1986 
Fortune 500 companies finding significant and 
positive market reactions on this kind of 
information. Lubatkin et al. (1989), Friedman and 
Singh (1989) and Beatty and Zajac (1987) focus on 
CEO successions, which using event study 
methodology show that this kind of corporate 
governance issues is associated with investors' 
consideration. Worrel et al. (1986) investigate the 
market reaction on the announcements of deaths of 
key executives and obtain significant negative 
results for a small portion of key executives that are 
perceived by investors as the most influential. In 
particular, the authors find that the death of a CEO 
who is also the chairman of a company is associated 
with statistically significant negative returns since 
the event is likely to create a double level of 
uncertainty. More recently, Donders et al. (1997) 
examine the implied volatility behaviour of call 
options around scheduled news announcement days; 
Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) investigate the 
relationships between Internet message-board 
activity and abnormal stock returns and trading 
volume. With a specific focus on corporate 
governance, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) use 
an event study to investigate the effect on firm value 
of the announcement of the amendments to the U.S. 
stock exchanges’ regulations following the corporate 
scandals and the subsequent introduction of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, during 2002. Similarly, Utrero-
González and Callado-Munoz (2016) examine the 
effects on performance and firm value of corporate 
governance regulations, specifically the Spanish 
Aldama Code of Best practice issued in 2003. 
Mittermayer and Knolmayer (2006) is one of the 
first research which focuses specifically on the 
information contained in press releases and take 
them as input to predict stock price changes by 
showing that press releases "have far more impact 
on stock prices than other news that often only 
repeat or comment the basic news contained in 
press releases". Lately, Henry (2006 and 2008) 
focuses his analysis on investors’ reactions to the 
disclosure of earnings press releases. Fahlenbrach et 
al. (2017) show that surprise independent director 
departures are subsequently followed by negative 
events for the companies, such as worse stock and 
operating performance, earnings restatements, 
shareholder litigation, extreme negative return 
event, and worse mergers and acquisitions. 
As already mentioned, to the best of our 
knowledge this paper is original by four different 
perspectives: i) it investigates banks; ii) the 
geographical setting is Europe; iii) it uses press 
releases as sources of news and definition of the 
events; iv) it focuses on corporate governance. Thus, 
the contribution to the existing literature may be 
substantial and the policy implications are relevant. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
We adopt the event study methodology (Campbell & 
MacKinlay, 1997; MacKinlay, 1997) since it provides 
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a precise estimate of the market's response to firms’ 
announcements. Moreover, it enables us to measure 
the effects of an event on the value of the listed 
company.  
Indeed, the event study is a statistical 
methodology for conducting an empirical 
investigation on the relationship between stock 
prices and specific economic events (Dyckman et al., 
1984). Following Kothari and Warner (2006), event 
studies are "the most successful empirical technique 
to date for isolating the price impact of the 
information content of corporate actions". In detail, 
we analyse whether the stochastic behaviour of 
stock prices is affected by the disclosure of firm-
specific events, which in our case are announcements 
related to corporate governance of a sample of banks, 
as specified in the following section. 
Given rationality in the marketplace, the effects 
of an event will be reflected immediately in security 
prices (MacKinlay, 1997). Indeed, we pose the 
assumption of "Market Efficiency" (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). This implies that stock prices 
incorporate all information available to investors 
(Fama, 1965); respectively all newly disclosed firm 
information is instantaneously incorporated into 
stock prices. In this environment, the disclosure of 
any price sensitive (and financially relevant) 
information can be considered as an "event".  
 
3.1. Sample of banks 
 
We test the hypothesis on the 30 banks listed on the
Eurostoxx banks index.  
The sample is composed of the 30 Euro Area 
banks of the Eurostoxx index in June 2016 (Table 1) 
all of which are significant entities supervised by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) (As of the list provided 
on 30th September 2015 which includes 120 credit 
institutions). The index is subject to periodic 
rebalancing and the composition used for our 
sample was introduced on 20 June 2016 with the 
entry of Alpha Bank, the re-entry after a number of 
years of ABN AMRO, the deletion of Banca Popolare 
di Sondrio and the substitution of National Bank of 
Greece with Eurobank Ergasias. The rationale for 
choosing this sample of banks is twofold. First, from 
a methodological perspective, since in an event 
study analysis the parameters of the estimation are 
derived by regressing the index returns to the 
stock’s returns, thus, having a sample of banks that 
are contained in the same index makes this process 
simpler and faster. This is expected to be 
particularly true if the sample comprises the whole 
population of stocks that make up the observed 
index. Second, since the sample comprises banks 
that are all supervised entities by the ECB, the policy 
implications are expected to be relevant for both 
policymakers and practitioners. Indeed, the former 
may be influenced in defining reporting and 
disclosing regulatory framework or standards. The 
latter may consider how the information disclosure 
is perceived by the market, in order to rethink the 
content and the ways in which corporate governance 
information should be communicated to the market. 
 
Table 1. Components of the Eurostoxx bank index 
 
Name Country Market Cap 31.12.2015 Total Assets 31.12.2015 
BNP Paribas FR 65,088,295 1,994,193,000 
Deutsche Bank DE 31,157,777 1,629,130,000 
Crdit Agricole FR 28,715,878 1,529,294,000 
Banco Santander ES 65,821,288 1,340,260,000 
Socit Gnrale FR 34,320,317 1,334,391,000 
UniCredit IT 30,671,295 860,433,400 
ING NL 48,178,363 841,769,000 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria ES 42,911,423 750,078,000 
Intesa Sanpaolo IT 49,006,090 676,496,000 
Commerzbank DE 12,022,637 532,641,000 
Natixis FR 16,328,828 500,257,000 
ABN AMRO NL 4,468,854 390,317,000 
Caixabank ES 18,695,008 344,255,500 
KBC Groep BE 24,093,430 252,356,000 
Banco de Sabadell ES 8,920,362 208,627,800 
Bankia ES 12,323,542 206,969,600 
Erste Group Bank AT 12,425,518 199,743,400 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena IT 3,606,458 169,012,000 
Banco Popular Espanol ES 6,581,828 158,649,900 
Bank of Ireland IE 11,003,514 130,960,000 
Banco Popolare IT 4,639,526 120,509,600 
Unione di Banche Italiane IT 5,590,844 117,200,800 
Raiffeisen Bank International AT 3,987,444 114,426,600 
Banco Comercial Portugus PT 2,951,951 74,884,900 
Eurobank Ergasias GR 2,273,439 73,553,000 
Mediobanca IT 7,631,078 70,710,600 
Alpha Bank GR 3,826,834 69,296,200 
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna IT 3,388,408 61,261,200 
Bankinter ES 5,878,584 58,659,800 
Banca Popolare di Milano IT 4,040,441 50,203,300 
Total  570,549,253 14,860,539,600 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostoxx, Bloomberg and Bankscope data 
 
Total assets of banks in the sample equal 14.86 
trillion euro, representing almost 70% of total assets 
of banks subject to the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) which amounted to 22 trillion euro 
at the end of the comprehensive assessment6. 
                                                          
6 European Central Bank (2014), Aggregate report on the comprehensive 
assessment, 26th October. "Note that the following banks did not participate in the 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is made up of the 
largest listed euro area banks, the sample is very 
heterogeneous in terms of size. Average total assets 
at the end of 2015 amounted to 501 billion euro 
                                                                                        
comprehensive assessment but will be directly supervised by the ECB as significant 
institutions: Banco de Credito Social Cooperativo, Banesco Holding Hispania, 
Banque Degroof S.A., Barclays Bank PLC (Italy), Novo Banco SA, Sberbank 
Europe AG, Unicredit Banka Slovenija d.d. and VTB Bank AG (Austria)". 
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with a standard deviation exceeding 112%. The top 5 
banks have total assets exceeding those of the 
remaining 25. 
Breakdown of sample banks by country (Table 
2) shows that, in terms of total assets at the end of 
2015, French banks make up over a third of the 
sample, followed by Spanish banks, almost a fifth, 
and Italian and German banks which represent over 
14% of total assets. The average size of banks in the 
sample varies greatly: French and German banks are 
much larger than Spanish and Italian banks (average 
total assets respectively of 1,382 billion euro, 1,090 
billion euro, 438 billion euro and 266 billion euro).  
 
Table 2. Total assets of Eurostoxx banks. Breakdown by country 
 
Country 
N. of 
banks 
Total Assets 
2010 
Total Assets 
2015 
Average size 
2015 
Std. dev. (%) 
2015 
AUSTRIA 2 337,111,100 2.16% 314,170,000 2.11% 157,085,000 38.40% 
BELGIUM 1 320,823,000 2.06% 252,356,000 1.70% 252,356,000 0.00% 
FRANCE 4 5,319,085,000 34.14% 5,358,135,000 36.06% 1,339,533,750 46.60% 
GERMANY 2 2,659,929,000 17.07% 2,161,771,000 14.55% 1,080,885,500 71.73% 
GREECE 2 153,986,300 0.99% 142,849,200 0.96% 71,424,600 4.21% 
IRELAND 1 167,473,000 1.08% 130,960,000 0.88% 130,960,000 0.00% 
ITALY 8 2,287,290,100 14.68% 2,125,826,900 14.31% 265,728,363 119.11% 
NETHERLANDS 2 1,626,604,000 10.44% 1,232,086,000 8.29% 616,043,000 51.82% 
PORTUGAL 1 98,546,700 0.63% 74,884,900 0.50% 74,884,900 0.00% 
SPAIN 7 2,607,799,700 16.74% 3,067,500,600 20.64% 438,214,371 104.08% 
Total 30 15,578,647,900 100.00% 14,860,539,600 100.00% 495,351,320 111.16% 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostoxx, Bloomberg and Bankscope data 
 
Table 3. Market capitalization and CET 1 of Eurostoxx banks. Breakdown by country (cont. d) 
 
Country 
N. of 
banks 
Market Capitalization  
2010 
Market Capitalization  
2015 
CET 1 
2010 
CET 2 
2015 
AUSTRIA 2 9,231,384 3.01% 16,412,962 2.88% 8.67% 12.04% 
BELGIUM 1 3,483,506 1.14% 24,093,430 4.22% 8.61% 15.76% 
FRANCE 4 66,890,812 21.85% 144,453,318 25.32% 11.86% 13.03% 
GERMANY 2 33,608,787 10.98% 43,180,414 7.57% 9.99% 15.03% 
GREECE 2 2,078,309 0.68% 6,100,272 1.07% 17.18% 29.04% 
IRELAND 1 2,470,865 0.81% 11,003,514 1.93% 9.17% 14.92% 
ITALY 8 51,009,095 16.66% 108,574,141 19.03% 11.96% 14.51% 
NETHERLANDS 2 21,296,062 6.96% 52,647,217 9.23% 11.07% 13.64% 
PORTUGAL 1 980,175 0.32% 2,951,951 0.52% 5.51% 16.21% 
SPAIN 7 115,145,510 37.61% 161,132,035 28.24% 9.93% 15.02% 
Total 30 306,194,506 100.00% 570,549,253 100.00% 10.99% 14.89% 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostoxx, Bloomberg and Bankscope data 
 
3.2. Sample of press releases 
 
Banks press releases are hand collected and 
classified based on their contents.  
In particular, the selection process of banks' 
press releases on corporate governance is performed 
as follows:  
1. Look for the press releases of all the banks 
of the sample in their respective websites;  
2. Run a content analysis in order to select all 
the press releases related to corporate governance; 
3. Ensure substantive relevance of the 
potential press releases by looking by reading all the 
press releases and checking for only contents that 
may have price sensitiveness, following the “fit for 
purpose” approach by Boaz and Ashby (2003) and 
Denyer et al. (2008);  
4. Consolidate results.  
This leads us to identify 70 press releases 
issued in the period 2007-2016 that report 
potentially price-sensitive events related to 
corporate governance (e.g. changes in management 
board, changes in supervisory board, changes in 
statutory auditors7 issued by 18 banks8 included in 
                                                          
7 Note that banks considered in the sample have different Corporate 
Governance models: (i) traditional model (or horizontal two-tier model, in 
which the Shareholders' Meeting appoints both the Board of Directors and the 
Board of Statutory Auditors. The Board of Directors has the management and 
the supervisory functions; the Board of Statutory Auditors is in charge of the 
control function); (ii) dualistic model (or vertical two-tier model, in which the 
the Eurostoxx Banks Index. Table 4 shows the 
breakdown of the selected press releases by bank 
and by year of disclosure. 
 
3.3. Model 
 
The Normal (or expected) Return (NR
it
) of bank i at 
time t is defined as the expected return 
unconditioned by the event taking place. In 
literature, several models have been employed to 
estimate the normal return (e.g. Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), Arbitrage Pricing Theorem (APT), 
multi-factor model). Following MacKinlay (1997), we 
use a one-factor market model, based on the CAPM 
findings, since benefits of employing multifactor 
models and economic models for event studies are 
not so significant (MacKinlay, 1997). 
                                                                                        
Shareholders' Meeting appoints the Supervisory Board, in charge of the 
control and the supervisory functions, that in turn appoints the Management 
Board, in charge of the management function); and (iii) monistic model (or 
one-tier model, in which the company is governed by one corporate body. 
The Shareholders' Meeting appoints the Board of Directors, that undertakes 
both management and supervisory functions and selects among its directors 
the Internal Audit Committee, which has the control function). 
8 Some banks were excluded from the final sample of analysis given the lack 
of price sensitive press releases or due to the lack of a sufficient length of the 
historical stock prices data. The latter was decided in order to ensure the 
suitability of the analysis (MacKinlay, 1997). 
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Table 4. Sample of press releases 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Banco BPM  1 1   1    1 4 
Banco Sabadell    1       1 
Banco Santander       1 1   2 
Bank of Ireland          1 1 
Bankia       1 2   3 
BBVA          1 1 
BNP Paribas 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 2 1 19 
CaixaBank        1   1 
Commerzbank 1 1 1  1      4 
Deutsche Bank       1  1 2 4 
Erste Group          1 1 
Intesa Sanpaolo    2  1 1  1 1 6 
KBC Group   1     1   2 
Natixis     2 1 2  2 1 8 
Raiffeisen Bank     1 1 1    3 
Societe Generale         1  1 
UBI Banca    2      1 3 
UniCredit   1 1  1   1 2 6 
Total 2 4 6 9 6 7 10 6 8 12 70 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration 
 
We collect stock prices (adjusted for dividends) 
and calculate related stock returns. The Eurostoxx 
Banks Index is considered the market index of our 
analysis. The estimation window of the event study 
is computed on 252 days in which the markets are 
open. We choose to consider a long period prior to 
the announcement in order to minimize the risk that 
the estimated returns are biased by information 
about the event. Moreover, we focus on 
announcement effects over a short horizon since it 
is the most useful method to provide evidence 
relevant for understanding corporate policy 
decisions (Kothari & Warner, 2006). Thus, as the 
event window, we consider t days around the event 
date, where t = (−5, 5). 
The Abnormal (or unexpected) Return (AR
it
) for 
bank i at time t is the difference between the actual 
stock Return (R
it
) and a measure of NR
it
 generated by 
the adopted market model.  
For every security i in our sample we thus 
generate the normal or expected return R
it
 for the 
period t as: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
with 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
where 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the Eurostoxx, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖  are the 
model parameters, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the zero-mean disturbance 
term and 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  is 𝜀𝑖𝑡 variance, assuming that assets 
returns are jointly multivariate normal and i.i.d. 
(independently and identically distributed) through 
time.  
As in Dedmen and Lin (2002) we calculate the 
daily logarithmic returns as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1) (2) 
 
 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the stock price for time t and 𝑃𝑡−1 is 
the stock price in t-1. 
Single Index Model (SIM) is used to find 
abnormal returns and Student's t-test is used for 
analyzing the significance level of abnormal returns. 
In particular, Expected Returns are computed as: 
 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑚𝑡 (3) 
 
with 𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖𝑡 and 𝛽𝑖𝑡  9 being respectively the 
market return on day t, the intercept and the slope 
of the regression line.  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 are then computed as: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖?̂? − 𝛼?̂? + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡̂  (4) 
 
 
where the first term is the actual return. We 
then calculate for each j event the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) and assess the statistical 
significance with robustness checks. 
We then calculate the Average Abnormal Return 
(AAR) for all the shares over the period of the 
analysis as: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 1/𝑛 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (5) 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return of bank i on 
day t and n is the sample size. 
In order to obtain the total effect of the 
abnormal returns, we calculate the Cumulative 
Average Return (CAR) and Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return (CAAR) over the event window 
starting at t
1
 and ending at t
2
: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡𝑖; 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (6) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡𝑖; 𝑡2) = 1/𝑛 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (7) 
 
Lastly, we aim at determining the significance 
level of the results using a t-Student test: 
 
𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁(𝐴𝐴𝑅/𝜎𝐴𝐴𝑅) (8) 
 
and 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅/𝜎𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) (9) 
 
                                                          
9 estimation on  historical values – 252 days – of stock returns and market 
returns. 
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where N is the event period of observation. 
All the statistics above mentioned are used to 
test the following hypothesis: 
H
0
: there is no significant relation between the 
performance of banks' stock prices and a bank press 
release on corporate governance. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Figure A.1, Table A.1 and A.2 report respectively 
AAR and CAAR; t-values and the results of the 
analysis. We find that stock market reacts negatively 
to the announcements as if this kind of news leads 
investors to perceive the bank's prospects 
negatively. We are conscious that more appropriate 
conclusion may be obtained by classifying press 
releases in respect to their specific contents; 
nonetheless, the statistic tests lead us to infer 
different deductions. Table A.2 shows that t-value 
for AAR has a negative reaction on the 
announcement day (at time t) – where the Average 
Abnormal Return is equal to -1.832%. t-values for 
CAAR during the event window period are positive 
only at t-3, t+3, t+5. The other observed t-values for 
AAR are negative. Nonetheless, t-values of AAR are 
significant at time t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and t+2 with 
Average Abnormal Returns -0.285%, -0.321%, -
0.105%, -0.098% and -0.148% respectively. Moreover, 
t-values for Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
are significant over the period of analysis. 
Thus, investment decisions are significantly but 
negatively influenced by the disclosure of press 
releases on corporate governance. 
Moreover, over the event window considered, 
the volume of the traded stocks increases quite 
constantly (with the biggest increase observed on 
the announcement day – at time t – at 21%). Thus, we 
observe a positive market reaction in the average 
volume changes statistics. 
This is a second proof that the disclosure of 
press releases related to corporate governance is 
relevant for investors and trading decision is 
significantly influenced.  
As a result, we can reject H
0
 and assert that a 
bank press release on corporate governance may 
significantly impact stock prices. 
One possible explanation is that the market 
anticipates that a change in the CEO – which is one 
of the main causes for press releases in our sample – 
leads to lower results in the short run as the new 
CEO will favour write-offs of any doubtful captions. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the impact on 
stock prices and the related volatility of press 
releases that contain Corporate Governance 
information in Euro area banks listed on the 
Eurostoxx banks index. 
As shown in the previous section, results of the 
analysis are relevant in terms of policy implication, 
even though there are some limitations related to 
the proposed model (e.g. the assumptions 
underlying event study methodology; the use of only 
one parametric test for testing the significance of 
AARs and CAARs; the proposed classification of the 
press releases). Nonetheless, we find significant 
results that show that the disclosure of press 
releases on corporate governance influence stock 
prices. Our results are consistent with the previous 
literature on the role of firm-based information and 
the impact of financial news (Fama, 1965; 
Niederhoffer, 1971; Merton, 1987; Ryan & Taffler, 
2002). We find that investment decisions are 
significantly but negatively influenced by the 
disclosure of a press release on corporate 
governance as if this kind of news lead the investors 
to perceive negatively the bank. This finding 
contributes to the strand of literature on voluntary 
disclosure that claims that an important driver of 
the disclosure and announcements to investors is 
that firms are inclined to send a signal to the market 
to obtain economic benefits (Fung et al., 2007; 
Utrero-Gonzalez & Callado-Munoz, 2016). In this 
perspective, voluntary disclosure is perceived to be 
biased by the incentive of the firms to overstate the 
good and understate their bad practices (Kruger, 
2015; Utrero-Gonzalez & Callado-Munoz, 2016).  
The event study’s methodology has some 
limitations that should be kept in mind. First of all, 
the assumption of market efficiency (Fama, 1965) 
implicit in this methodology is not valid in some 
cases, thus stock prices may not fully and 
immediately reflect all the information disclosed to 
the market. Moreover, under a noisy estimation 
period, the estimation of parameters is noisy too 
(Aktas, De Bodt & Cousin, 2007). MacKinlay (1997) 
reports that there are cases10 in which the event date 
is difficult to be precisely identified, leading to a less 
useful application of this methodology. We overtake 
this limitation by considering the bank's publication 
of the press release as an economic event, thus the 
event date can be precisely identified. 
Other limitations are specifically related to 
technical aspects related to the methodology. For 
example, the length of the estimation window (that 
we set as 252 days) is subject to a trade-off between 
improved estimation accuracy and potential 
parameter shifts (Sitthipongpanich, 2011). The 
estimation of expected returns may lead to wrong 
inference due to positive (negative) bias and may 
produce upwardly (downwardly) abnormal returns 
during bull (bear) markets (Kelin & Rosenfeld, 1987; 
Shih, 1992; Kothari & Warner, 2006; 
Sitthipongpanich, 2011).  
Indeed, the issues here proposed may be 
deeper investigated in further research. In particular, 
further research may be conducted using country-
specific stock market indices in order to avoid 
country-specific effects (as of national shocks) that 
may drive large abnormal returns rather than firm-
specific factors.  
Nonetheless, the contribution to the existing 
literature stems from the fact that to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first paper that investigates 
the impact on stock prices of European bank's press 
releases on corporate governance. Findings are 
relevant for banks' management and their disclosure 
policy. This calls for further research to investigate 
differences and similarities between an area of 
governance disclosure and another. 
                                                          
10 i.e. "the wealth effects of regulatory changes for affected entities can be 
difficult to detect using event study methodology. The problem is that 
regulatory changes are often debated in the political arena over time and any 
accompanying wealth effects generally will gradually be incorporated into the 
value of a corporation as the probability of the change being adopted 
increases" (MacKinlay, 1997). 
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Appendix A. Tables and figures 
 
Figure A.1. AAR and CAAR of the event study 
 
 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration 
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Table A.1. t-values of the event study 
 
Day Average change in volume 
t-5  
t-4 9% 
t-3 22% 
t-2 14% 
t-1 2% 
t 21% 
t+1 4% 
t+2 5% 
t+3 4% 
t+4 5% 
t+5 7% 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration 
 
Table A.2. Results of the analysis 
 
Day AAR 
t-values 
AAR 
Signif. 
tAAR 
CAAR 
t-values 
CAAR 
Signif. 
tCAAR 
√𝑵 σ AAR σ CAAR 
t-5 -0.01% -0.188 No -0.01% -0.094 No 3.3166 0.0019 0.0038 
t-4 -0.21% -3.712 Yes -0.23% -1.962 Yes    
t-3 0.35% 6.052 Yes 0.12% 1.083 No    
t-2 -0.29% -4.945 Yes -0.16% -1.406 No    
t-1 -0.32% -5.568 Yes -0.48% -4.207 Yes    
t -0.11% -1.832 Yes -0.59% -5.129 Yes    
t+1 -0.10% -1.696 Yes -0.69% -5.982 Yes    
t+2 -0.15% -2.565 Yes -0.83% -7.272 Yes    
t+3 0.09% 1.503 No -0.75% -6.516 Yes    
t+4 -0.21% -3.68 Yes -0.96% -8.368 Yes    
t+5 0.01% 0.198 No -0.95% -8.268 Yes    
Note: Authors’ own elaboration 
  
  
